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Legal scholars have regularly focused on the conflict episodes between the Court of Justice
and national constitutional courts. We try instead to investigate the techniques that both the Court
of Justice and its national counterparts use to develop a hidden judicial dialogue, through which a
non-legally bound harmonization is pursued, and mostly achieved. Moreover, we understand these
strategies in the light of the notion of comity, and we compare the opposite attitudes kept by the
Court of Justice towards national courts and international tribunals to describe its shifting attitude,
which is due to its interest in preserving a pre-eminent position in the interpretive competition over
EC law.
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 I Goals of the paper 
 
The preliminary ruling as described in Art. 234 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community (ECT) was intended to represent the main instrument by 
which national courts, that are the domestic guarantors of the application of EC 
law, ask the European Court of Justice about its correct interpretation, by lodging 
a preliminary referral. Therefore, traditionally the literature has widely focused on 
this instrument as a tool of judicial cooperation between ordinary judges and the 
Court of Justice, with this latter playing the role of the “consultant” vis-à-vis 
national colleagues. 
Many authors have also stressed the communicational difficulty between 
the Court of Justice and the Constitutional Courts due to the fact that most 
Constitutional Courts have avoided the preliminary ruling (with the Belgian, 
Austrian, Lithuanian and - within the limit of the “principaliter proceeding”- 
Italian exceptions). Few analyses have been devoted, instead, to the techniques of 
“hidden” dialogue invented by the Constitutional Courts to assure the coherence 
of the multilevel legal order and the national constitutional autonomy. There is, in 
fact, a dark and unexplored side of the relationship between Constitutional Courts 
and Court of Justice which feeds itself with the some non- orthodox ways of 
judicial communication.  
The Court of Justice has reacted to this approach by alternating soft 
(persuasion: see Omega case) and hard (supremacy without exceptions: see 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft) instruments in order to assure the respect for 
constitutional diversity and the reasons of the supranational integration. 
In our opinion, this mutual attitude can be interpreted as a matter of 
judicial comity1: courts prefer to avoid wearying conflicts when their own 
existence is at stake. Thus they are ready to apply self-restraint and to conform 
their practices to a dialogic structure: regardless of where the final interpretive 
balance is put, the uniformity of the legal order is assured: national courts are 
reluctant to trigger a challenge to the Court of Justice and the Court of Justice is 
content with its (implicit) role of keeper of either the communitarian law, and of 
its coherent application. 
When, on the contrary, an external subject (rectius: a judicial actor 
pertaining to another legal order) jeopardizes such virtual monopoly owned by the 
Court of Justice, then its reactions cease to show this cooperative feature, suffice 
it to recall the intransigent wording of Opinion 1/91, or the Mox Plant decision; in 
these cases comity was not the judicial policy to adopt, as the risk to avert was the 
fragmentation of the EC order. 
                                                 
1 This concept will be explained in Section V of this article. 
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 This paper is divided in two parts: in the first part we attempt to sum up 
the techniques of the “hidden” judicial dialogue invented by the Constitutional 
Courts and the ways of responding by the Court of Justice while in the second we 
will try to “adapt” the notion of comity to the European judicial context. 
Our reasoning has two premises: the former is represented by the existence 
of a common axiological field shared by the Court of Justice and the national 
constitutional Courts thanks to the progressive communitarization of the “counter-
limits”. The latter could be illustrated by the formula of the limited flexibilization 
of supremacies used by Ferreres Comella2 with specific regard to the Spanish side 
of the dialogue. 
As for the first point, by the formula “counter-limits” (‘controlimiti3’) we 
mean those national fundamental principles which have been raised - like 
impenetrable barriers - against the penetration of EU law by the national 
Constitutional Courts. The ‘counter-limits’ are conceived as a form of ‘contrepoid 
au pouvoir communautaire’,4 an ultimate wall to the full application of EC law, 
intangible nucleus of national constitutional sovereignty.5  
The counter-limits doctrine (‘dottrina dei controlimiti’) was de facto 
conceived in Solange I by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht6 and in case 
183/73 (but see also 170/847) by the Italian Constitutional Court. However, many 
                                                 
2 V. Ferreres Comella, ‘La Constitución española ante la clausola de primacia del Derecho de la 
Unión europea. Un comentario a la Declaración 1/2004 del Tribunal Constitucional 1/2004’, in A. 
Lopez Castillo - A. Saiz Arnaiz - V. Ferreres Comella, Constitución española y constitución 
europea (Centro de estudios políticos y constitucionales, 2005) 77-100, 80-89. 
3 This formula has been introduced in the Italian scholarly debate by Paolo Barile: P. Barile, 
‘Ancora su diritto comunitario e diritto interno’ in Studi per il XX anniversario dell’Assemblea 
costituente, VI (Firenze, 1969) 49. 
4 About the notion of contrepoids au pouvoir see: B. Manin, ‘Frontières, freins et contrepoids—La 
séparation des pouvoirs dans le débat constitutionnel américain de 1787’, (1994) Revue française 
de sciences politiques, 257-293; T. Georgopoulos ‘The checks and balances doctrine in member 
states as a rule of EC law: the cases of France and Germany’, (2003) 9 European Law Journal, 
530–548. 
5 It is very interesting to notice that the notion of the counter-limits implies a sort of constitutional 
and moral superiority of the national legal orders with regard to the supranational level. This form 
of constitutional superiority is usually justified by the existence of the democratic deficit which 
characterizes the EU. See, for example, Solange I (see note below): ‘the Community still lacks a 
democratically legitimated parliament directly elected by general suffrage which possesses 
legislative powers and to which the Community organs empowered to legislate are fully 
responsible on a political level.’ 
6 BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974), available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/, English 
translation available in 2 CMLR 540 (1974), Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel. 
7 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 180/1974: ‘Questo Collegio ha, nella sent. n. 183/73, già 
avvertito come la legge di esecuzione del Trattato possa andar soggetta al suo sindacato, in 
riferimento ai principi fondamentali del nostro ordinamento costituzionale e ai diritti inalienabili 
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 Constitutional Courts accepted it in the following years: recently the Conseil 
Constitutionnel in 20048 and Tribunal Constitucional in Spain,9 but before them 
in Great Britain10 the Court of Appeal admitted the primacy of EC law by 
preserving a hard core of principles. One of the most interesting cases is the 
Danish one, Carlsen,11 when the Supreme Court specified the possible dynamics 
of such a declaration.12  
More recently the decisions of the Polish13 and German Constitutional 
Courts14 (but see also the decisions of the Cypriot15 and Czech16 judges) have 
reproposed the issue of the ultimate barriers in the field of the European arrest 
warrant.17  
Despite these decisions, in this article we will just focus on the first pillar’s 
ambit, thus we will avoid extending our reasoning to the third pillar.18 This choice 
                                                                                                                                     
della persona umana’. On this point see M. Cartabia, Principi inviolabili e integrazione europea 
(Giuffrè, 1995). 
8But see also Conseil d’Etat, dec. Sarran, 30 October 1998; Cour de Cassation, dec. Fraisse, 2 
june 2000; Conseil d’Etat, dec. SNIP, 3 December 2001. In addition see: Conseil Constitutionnel 
2004-496-497-498-499 DC 2004-505 DC, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/   
9 Tribunal Constitucional, declaracìon 1/2004. About this point, see V. Ferreres Comella, La 
Constitución española cit., 80-89, and A. Saiz Arnaiz, ‘De primacia, supremazia y derechos 
fundamentales en la Europa integrada: la Declaración del Tribunal Constitucional de 13 diciembre 
de 2004 y el Tratado por el que establece una Constitución para Europa’, ibidem, 51-75. 
10 McWhirter and Gouriet v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, [2003], EWCA civ 384. On this 
point see A. Biondi, ‘Principio di supremazia e “Costituzione” inglese. I due casi “Martiri del 
sistema metrico” e “Mc Whirter and Gouriet”’, available at 
www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/index3.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=101&Itemid=8
2.  
11 Højesteret, Carlsen v Rasmussen, [1999] 3 CMLR 854. 
12 According to the Carlsen doctrine if there is a doubt about the consistency of the EC act with 
the Constitution, the Constitutional Courts could raise the question by asking the Court of Justice 
to clarify the exact meaning of the norm. If the Court of Justice did not convince them of the 
compatibility, they could “apply” the counter-limits theory. Such a vision demonstrates that the 
Constitutional Courts have the last word even though they have accepted the preliminary ruling. 
13 Trybunał konstytucyjny, P 1/05, available at www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/index.htm  
14 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2236/04 (EAW case), available at www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/  
15 Ανώτατο Δικαστήριο, 294/2005, available at www.cylaw.org  
16 Ústavní Soud, Pl. ÚS 66/04, available at http://angl.concourt.cz/angl_verze/doc/pl-66-04.php. 
17 In the paper we will focus on the first pillar because of the differences existing between Art. 234 
ECT and 35 EUT. As for the role of the Court of Justice in this ambit see: J. Komarek, ‘European 
Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: in search of the limits of contrapunctual 
principles’, Jean Monnet Working paper, 10/05, available at 
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/05/051001.html. 
18 The pillar structure is a helpful image reflecting the distribution of competences within the 
European order. The first pillar covers Community’s policies. The second pillar concerns common 
foreign and security policy, whilst the third pillar covers police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. 
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 reflects the unique interpretative power owned by the Court of Justice in the first 
pillar, a power provided for under Articles 220(1), 234 and 292 of ECT.19 
In spite of the strictness shown in their decisions, the Constitutional Courts 
have never used this “weapon” in the field of EC Law and in the recent years the 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht changed its position by substituting the case 
by case control (hypothesized in Solange I) with an abstract control of the general 
compatibility of EC law with the demands of the protection of rights (Solange II,20 
Maastricht,21 Banana22). 
Something similar happened in Italy with judgment No. 232/198923: from 
that decision, in fact, the Italian Constitutional Court has implicitly admitted that 
the possible contrast with the Constitution would not cause the invalidity of the 
act of execution of the EC Treaty but only the non-applicability of EC rule.24 
The fact that the Constitutional Courts have not ever put such counter-
limits theory into practice can be partially explained by the progressive 
constitutionalisation of the EC law. The result of this constitutionalisation process 
is the progressive rapprochement between the common constitutional traditions 
and the counter-limits, between the rationale of integration and that of 
diversification. 
With respect to the second premise: as we know, at the beginning of the 
relationship the two Courts (national Constitutional Courts and the Court of 
Justice) started from opposing positions of pure monism (Court of Justice) and 
dualism (Constitutional Courts). 
During the following years this “pureness” was overcome and 
Constitutional Courts began to talk about two “autonomous and separated, 
                                                 
19 Reading, respectively: ‘[220] The Court of Justice [...] shall ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of this Treaty the law is observed’; ‘[234] The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction 
to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and 
interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the ECB [...]’; ‘[292] Member 
States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty 
to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein [i.e., before the Court of 
Justice]’. 
Despite the similarities existing between Art. 234 ECT and Art. 35 of EUT some differences, in 
fact, are evident: see for example the lack of distinction between supreme courts (i.e. ‘a court or 
tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national 
law’) and other courts in Art. 35 EUT as regards the duty (‘shall bring the matter before the Court 
of Justice’) or the faculty (‘may request the Court of Justice’) to raise the question to the Court of 
Justice. 
20 BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986), English translation available in 3 CMLR 225 (1987), re the application 
of Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft. 
21BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993), English translation available in 1 CMLR 57 (1994), Manfred Brunner 
et al v. The European Union Treaty. 
22 BVerfGE 102, 147 (2000), available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de. 
23 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 232/1989, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
24 See M. Cartabia - J. Weiler, L’Italia in Europa (Mulino, 2000), 171-172. 
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 although coordinated” systems (Italian Constitutional Court for example in case 
No. 170/1984); at the same time the Court of Justice has demonstrated to 
appreciate the efforts of these national actors by assuming - sometimes - a benign 
and tolerant attitude.  
The first characteristic of the jurisdictional dialogue described is therefore 
the “mutability”25 of the starting position of the Constitutional justices and of the 
Court of Justice.  
Such a premise is very important to understand the situation of instability 
that characterizes the relationship between Constitutional Courts and the Court of 
Justice. On the one hand, the Constitutional Courts have progressively accepted 
the EC law supremacy and have entrusted its protection to the ordinary judges, 
despite the lack of a national or supranational clause of primauté. 
On the other hand, the Constitutional Courts have claimed to maintain 
their own role (the role of the guardians of the national constitutional identity) 
without exceptions. They refused the acceptance of dangerous monistic visions in 
order to preserve the constitutional identity of their legal orders.  
Obviously, despite this progressive convergence, the tension between 
these two actors has not been missing because of the progressive expansion of the 
Court of Justice’s activity in national fields but in our opinion it is possible to 
draw a less pessimistic picture by considering some non-orthodox ways of judicial 
communication. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 It is possible, indeed, to notice a strong evolution in the Italian Constitutional Court case-law: 
compare, for example, case No. 14/1964- where the Italian Constitutional Court interpreted the 
relationship between national and EC acts in the light of chronological criterion (on the basis of 
the fact that the enabling act of ratification of the European Treaties was an ordinary legislative 
act)- with cases No. 183/1973 - where the Constitutional Court recognized the constitutional basis 
of EC law supremacy in Art. 11 of the Italian Constitution - and 170/1984 (where the Italian Court 
entrusted such a control to the national ordinary judges). In Spain, the Tribunal Constitucional 
used Art. 93 of the Spanish Constitution as a basis to found the EC law supremacy without giving 
the EC law a constitutional degree in the legal sources system. Nevertheless, it is possible to notice 
a strong evolution in Tribunal Constitucional case-law from the judgment No. 28/1991 and 
Declaración No. 1/1992 up to the very recent declaration 1/2004. In this case the Spanish justices 
adopted a more substantial reading of Art. 93 of the Constitution, no longer conceiving it as a 
merely procedural clause. 
As we know, the German justices softened their argumentations after Solange I by conceiving a 
form of cooperation between courts for the protection of fundamental rights 
(“Kooperationverhältnis”) although they have never completely abandoned the dualistic vision. 
Before 1992, then, they employed Art. 24 of Basic Law (on the participation to international 
organizations) to explain the penetration of the EC law. 
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 II The techniques of hidden dialogue 
 
Once assumed the supremacy of EC law, the Constitutional Courts dealt with 
another enigma: how could they guarantee the equilibrium between the levels as 
well as the dialogue with the Court of Justice? 
As we know the English High Court26 and the Irish,27 Greek,28 Danish,29 
and Finnish30 Supreme Courts have accepted the dialogue with the Court of 
Justice while the Constitutional Courts (except for the Belgian31, Austrian32 
Lithuanian33 and - recently - Italian34 Constitutional Courts) in general have 
avoided it. They have always preferred to be excluded from the dynamics of the 
preliminary ruling by refusing to define themselves as “judges” according to EC 
law. On the contrary, they have raised some ultimate barriers against the 
penetration of EC law in order to define the fundamental principles of the legal 
orders of which they are the guardians. 
Many Constitutional Courts, in fact, do not consider themselves judges 
under Art. 234 ECT, and have always refused to raise the question to the Court of 
Justice,35 despite its opinion.36 
To resolve such a problem, national constitutional justices have invented 
some expedients that allow them not to interrupt the communication with the 
Court of Justice. 
For example, many Courts have tried to explain the supremacy of EC law 
by placing the EC rules above the primary sources of law, but still below the 
Constitution, through the introduction of a new step in the legal sources 
                                                 
26 34/79 Henn and Derby [1979] ECR 3795. 
27 182/83 Fearon c. Irish Land Commission [1984] ECR 3677. 
28 348/96 Calfa [1999] ECR I- 11. 
29 151/78 Sukkerfrabiken Nykobing [1979] ECR, 1147. 
30 172/99 Liikenne [2001] ECR 475. 
31 Cour d’Arbitrage, 19 February 1997, No. 6/97, available at 
www.arbitrage.be/fr/common/home.html. 
32 VfGH, 10 March 1999, B 2251/97, B 2594/97, available at www.vfgh.gv.at/cms/vfgh-site. 
33 Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinis Teismas, Decision of 8 May 2007, available at 
www.lrkt.lt/dokumentai/2007/d070508.htm.  
34 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 102/2008 and ordinanza No. 103/2008, both available at 
www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
35 See Italian cases Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No. 206/1976; Corte Costituzionale, sentenza 
No. 168/1991 and Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No. 536/1995, all available at 
www.cortecostituzionale.it; Spanish case Tribunal Constitucional, sentencia No. 372/1993, 
available at www.tribunalconstitucional.es; French case Conseil Constitutionnel, 2006-540 DC, 
available at www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr. 
36 54/1996 Dorsch Consult Ingenieursgesellschaft / Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin [1997] ECR I-
4961. 
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 hierarchy.37 Such an attempt has created confusion in the Constitutional Courts 
case-law itself, as the contradictions of the Tribunal Constitucional’s findings 
demonstrate. In case no. 28/1991, in fact, the Tribunal Constitucional used two 
formulas to define the normative strength of the EC law – “non constitutional 
law” and “infra-constitutional law” - while in other cases it used the formula 
“constitutionally relevant (law)”.38 
Consequently, according to the Tribunal Constitucional, the contrast 
between the EC law and the national law cannot be seen as a figure of un-
constitutionality of the national rule: it is a question of legality which has to be 
resolved by the ordinary judges. 
Similarly, there is an evident manipulation of the constitutional text 
operated by the Belgian Cour d’Arbitrage with regard to art. 34 of the 
Constitution in order to give a partial super-constitutionality to the EC law, still 
without endorsing the competence of its guarantee. 
Something similar happened in England in the Thoburn39 case. In this 
case, the judge recognized the existence of a constitutional group of statutes and 
acts: this group of constitutional statutes and laws also included the 1972 E.C. 
Act. In this way, the English judges guaranteed the reasons of the integration and 
the EC law supremacy but, at the same time, recognized that the supremacy rests 
in the acceptance and in the self-limitation of the English Parliament (i.e. in an 
Act of the Parliament). 
Another example of the creative constitutional case-law is the distinction 
between “primacia y supremacia” conceived by the Tribunal Constitucional.40 
This was done in order to explain the compatibility between the reasons of 
integration and the guarantee of the Constitution. A further proof of this trend is 
the very recent acknowledgement41 of the exhaustibility of recurso de amparo 
when the ordinary judge refuses to refer to the Court of Justice ex Art. 234 ECT. 
If this refusal implies the violation of a fundamental right guaranteed by recurso 
de amparo, it is possible to proceed before the Tribunal Constitucional for 
violation of Art. 24 of the Spanish Constitution. By this revirement the Tribunal 
                                                 
37 A similar strategy was recently followed by the Italian Constitutional Court, that was called to 
rule on the status of treaty international law in the domestic hierarchy of sources of law. See Corte 
Costituzionale, sentenze No. 348 and 349 /2007. See also the comment by F. Biondi Dal Monte 
and F. Fontanelli, ‘The Decisions No. 348 and 349/2007 of the Italian Constitutional Court: The 
Efficacy of the European Convention in the Italian Legal System’, (2008) 9 German Law Journal, 
889-932. 
38 See Tribunal Constitucional, sentencia No. 28/1991, available at www.tribunalconstitucional.es. 
Concerning the terminology used by the Tribunal Constitucional see: C. Vidal Prado, El impacto 
del nuevo derecho europeo en los Tribunales Constitucionales (Madrid, 2004) 156-159. 
39 High Court- Queen's Bench Division Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council, CMLR, 50. 
40 Tribunal Constitucional, declaración 1/2004, available at  www.tribunalconstitucional.es. 
41 Tribunal Constitucional, sentencia 58/2004, available at  www.tribunalconstitucional.es. 
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 Constitucional has compensated the Court of Justice for the refusal to accept the 
mechanism of preliminary ruling. 
The Italian Constitutional Court is particularly active in this field with 
expedients like the acknowledgement of erga omnes effects (ie the normal effects 
of the classical sources of law according to some scholars42) to the interpretative 
rulings of the Court of Justice and the dual preliminarity (“doppia 
pregiudizialità”).43 
The first technique consists of the acknowledgment of the peculiar 
interpretative function of the Court of Justice: the Italian Constitutional Court has 
recognised erga omnes effects to the Court of Justice’s rulings in its case-law 
(mainly in 113/198544 and 389/198945) because they share certain characteristics 
with the classic EC legal sources. 
In the Italian Constitutional Court’s reasoning, these interpretative rulings 
present the normal effect of the classical EC legal sources when they contain the 
interpretation of EC legal provisions characterized by such effects: direct 
applicability and direct effect. In this way the Italian Court put the classic EC acts 
(regulations, directives) on an equal footing with the Court of Justice 
interpretative rulings. Following this reasoning, according to the Italian 
Constitutional Court, the ordinary judge’s duty to non-apply the internal law 
contrasting with the EC law has to be extended to the case of contrast between the 
national law and those interpretative rulings of the Court of Justice. The reasoning 
of the Italian Constitutional Court takes as its starting point the particular position 
covered by the Court of Justice in the EC legal system.  
The interpretative rulings of the Court of Justice would be second grade 
sources because they infer their legal power from the interpreted provisions. In 
fact, the Italian Court recognised the content and the effects of the classic 
                                                 
42 A. Pizzorusso, ‘Le fonti del diritto’, in A. Scialoja - G. Branca (eds.), Commentario del codice 
civile, Disposizioni sulla legge in generale (Artt. 1-9) (Bologna-Roma) 1977, 15. Pizzorusso tried 
to look at the effects of a normative act or fact, finding in its erga omnes effects (conceived as the 
opposite of the inter partes effects which characterize, instead, a contract) the common feature of 
all the sources of law in order to overcome the critiques put forward towards the theory of the 
general and abstract act. 
43 M. Cartabia, ‘Il processo costituzionale: l'iniziativa. Considerazioni sulla posizione del giudice 
comune di fronte a casi di ‘doppia pregiudizialità’, comunitaria e costituzionale’, (1997) 5 il Foro 
italiano, 222–225. For a very similar point of view about the dual preliminarity see in English M. 
Cartabia, ‘Taking Dialogue Seriously’ The Renewed Need for a Judicial Dialogue at the Time of 
Constitutional Activism in the European Union’, Jean Monnet Working paper, 12/07, available at 
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/07/071201.html. 
See Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No.536/1995, and Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No. 
319/1996, both available at www.cosrtecostituzionale.it. 
44 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 113/1985, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
45 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 389/1989, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
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 communitarian sources (direct effect and direct applicability) only if the 
interpreted provisions have such effects. 
This is an indirect recognition of the strong role of the Court of Justice and 
implies (for the national judge) the extension of the obligation of non-application 
of national law contrasting with the interpretative rulings of the Court of Justice.  
According to the second technique (dual preliminarity), the Constitutional 
Court could be asked to solve a question of constitutionality regarding an Italian 
norm in cases where such a question is strongly related to another preliminary 
ruling question contemporarily raised before the Court of Justice (either by the 
same or by another ordinary judge) on the meaning/validity of an EC act. 
If these two questions are strongly related, the Italian Constitutional Court 
can decide to return the question (declaring it “inadmissible”) to the ordinary 
judge (536/199546) or “wait for” the Court of Justice to pronounce before judging 
(165/200447). 
As we can see, the dual preliminarity is a technique by which the Italian 
Constitutional Court recognizes a “priority” to the Court of Justice and to Art. 234 
ECT questions; at the same time, it can work as a “safety valve”, as it avoids a 
contrast with the Court of Justice with regard to the possible violation of the 
counter-limits. In Berlusconi case for example the Italian Constitutional Court 
(165/200448) waited for the Court of Justice’s answer, preparing itself for a 
decision that could possibly be incompatible with its fundamental principles. All 
this was also caused by the Court of Justice’s progressive orientation to accept 
questions concerning de facto the contrast between EC law and national 
legislative acts (although “dressed” as interpretative questions of EC law). Thanks 
to the dual preliminarity, the Italian Court allows the Court of Justice to decide 
whether to challenge the risk of a jurisdictional “clash” or not. On the other hand 
it is perhaps possible to read the Berlusconi case as an attempt to avoid such a 
danger, and as a chance to show the EC system ripeness about fundamental rights. 
The very recent revirement49 of the Italian Constitutional Court does not 
constitute a material change, since the Court accepted to raise the preliminary 
question to the Court of Justice only within the principaliter proceeding, a judicial 
procedure that bears some peculiar features (inter partes nature, absence of a quo 
judge etc). 
                                                 
46 Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No. 536/1995, available at  www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
47 Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No. 165/2004, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
48 Corte Costituzionale, ordinanza No. 165/2004, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
49 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 102/2008 and ordinanza No. 103/2008, 
www.cortecostituzionale.it. As we wrote in the incidenter proceeding the principle of “mutual 
impermeability” between EC and national law: was applied; according to the decisions No. 
384/1994 and 94/1995 the Italian Constitutional Court decided to “centralise” the questions of 
consistency between national and EC law and to solve them within the framework of the 
principaliter proceeding. 
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 The mechanism of the dual preliminarity, in fact, implies the existence of a 
judicial triangle (national a quo judge; national Constitutional Court and Court of 
Justice) which does not exist in the principaliter proceeding.  
Another technique consists of the distinction between disapplication and 
non-application. In the Italian context, the Constitutional Court started to accept 
that the guarantee of the EC law’s supremacy was entrusted to national judges 
with an important specification: technically, the judge can not “disapply”50 the 
national law contrasting with the EC act but he must “not apply” the national rule 
contrasting with directly applicable EC law (a regulation, in the earlier case-law,51 
but then also self-executing directives52 and interpretative rulings concerning 
directly effective and directly applicable norms, see cases no. 113/198553 and 
389/198954). Disapplication, in the Constitutional Court’s reasoning, is a figure of 
invalidity55 which would presume a hierarchical relationship between 
supranational and national legal orders. It would imply the subordination of the 
Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice (the hierarchy between orders which 
conduct to the hierarchy of Courts) while non-application is a figure of inefficacy, 
limited to the specific case before the national judge.56 The Italian case - along 
with the German one - is very relevant for a complete understanding of reasons 
underlying the “resistance”. 
Having a look at these techniques it is possible to notice a progressive 
rapprochement between the Courts (national and supranational) through non-
orthodox ways. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 106/77 Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato /Simmenthal, [1978] ECR 629. 
51 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 170/1984, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
52 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 64/1990, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
53 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 113/1985, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
54 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 389/1989, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
55 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 168/91, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. Contra, see 
104/86 Commission / Italy, [1988] ECR 1799. 
56 The exceptions to this scheme are represented by the following: 1) the case of the “principaliter 
proceeding” (when the legislative act-which is supposed to be unconstitutional- is contested by a 
Region or the State on the basis of art. 127 of the Italian Constitution); 2) the case of contrast 
between national norms and non-directly effective or directly-applicable EC rules; 3) the case of 
violations of the national counter-limits; 4) within the control of admissibility of abrogative 
referendum (sentenze No.64/1990 and 41/2000); 5) the permanent contrast between internal norms 
and a fundamental principle of the European Community (sentenza No.286/1986). In these cases 
the Constitutional Court considered itself to be competent. See P. Costanzo - L. Mezzetti - A. 
Ruggeri, Lineamenti di diritto costituzionale dell’Unione europea (Torino, 2006) 284. 
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 III The Court of Justice’s point of view 
 
The Court of Justice itself has changed its position over the years showing a 
behaviour oscillating between constitutional accelerations and self-restraint, 
always looking at the possible effects of its decisions on national legal orders. 
By attempting to apply the idea of the techniques of hidden dialogue to the 
Court of Justice’s side, it is possible to identify three strategies: a) the progressive 
“refinement” of the idea of primacy, due to the double process of 
constitutionalisation of the EU and communitarization of the counterlimits; b) the 
terminological attention; c) the preventive evaluation of the impact of its case-law 
on the national legislation. In this part of the paper we will focus on the first 
technique devoting few comments to the other two. 
First of all, it is possible to notice a progressive mitigation of the idea of 
absolute primacy of the EU law. 
This statement can be supported by a rapid comparison between the 
“blind” supremacy of the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft57 (para. 3) with latest 
judgements:  
 
Therefore the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a member 
State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental 
rights as formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles of its 
constitutional structure. 
 
We can notice that, according to the reasoning of the Court of Justice, the 
respect of fundamental rights is seen as an exception to the primacy of EC law.  
This kind of argumentation was drawn on in a recent order of the 
European Court of First Instance (Gonnelli e Aifo v. Commission , para. 57)58: 
 
Furthermore, in their observations on the objection of inadmissibility, the 
applicants cannot maintain that, to remedy this alleged lack of judicial 
protection, the Italian Constitutional Court could refrain from applying 
Community measures contrary to the fundamental rights proclaimed in the 
national Constitution since, in accordance with settled case-law, Community law 
has primacy over national law.59 
 
Normally by the formula “constitutionalisation” of the EC legal order, the 
authors60 mean the progressive shift of the EC law from the perspective of an 
                                                 
57 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125. 
58 T-231/02 Gonnelli e Aifo v. Commission [2004] ECR II-1051. 
59 6/64 Costa [1964] ECR 1141. 
60 For example M. Cartabia - J .H. H. Weiler, L’Italia in Europa (Mulino, 2000) 73. About the 
ambiguity of the notion of constitutionalisation in EC/EU Law see: F. Snyder, ‘The unfinished 
constitution of the European Union’, in J. H. H. Weiler - M. Wind (eds.), European 
constitutionalism beyond the state (Cambridge University Press, 2003); B. Rittberger - F. 
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 international organization to a federal state perspective. We can stress another 
meaning of constitutionalisation of the EC legal order, with regard to the 
progressive “humanization” of the law of the common market. It is a very famous 
story which started with judgements like Nold,61 Stauder62 and was enriched, in 
the latest years, by judgements like Omega and Berlusconi.63 
The partial overcoming of the vision of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
was contained in the Omega case. In Omega,64 the Court said that ‘Community 
law does not preclude an economic activity consisting of the commercial 
exploitation of games simulating acts of homicide from being made subject to a 
national prohibition measure adopted on grounds of protecting public policy by 
reason of the fact that that activity is an affront to human dignity.’ This statement 
should be read as the final line of a long run, which started after Solange I. This 
judgment intends to demonstrate (before a German judge: it is not a coincidence) 
the ripeness of the EU legal system and, in general, the outcome of the 
constitutional dialogue with the national interlocutors. Something similar 
happened in the Berlusconi65 case (before an Italian reference). 
These argumentations are probably supported by strategic (and persuasive) 
reasons, due also to the broad notion of human dignity and of retroactive 
application of lenient penalty assumed by the Court; anyway it is clear that such 
decisions are the result of a long conversation with the national courts. 
By doing this, the Court assumes the respect of fundamental rights as a 
premise of its discourse, rather than as an exception to the primacy of EC law.  
This process of convergence between the languages of the (national and 
supranational) courts has contributed to the creation of a common axiological 
field between the different (constitutional) legal orders. This common axiological 
field can be described as the heart of multilevel constitutionalism. 
The rapprochement between legal orders is confirmed by the ‘structural 
continuity’ between common constitutional traditions and counter-limits. From a 
theoretical point of view, in fact, the counter-limits are related to the input of the 
communitarian legal materials in the inner order; the common constitutional 
traditions, instead, are related to the input of inner legal materials in the European 
legal order. Apparently they both follow opposite routes and are inspired by 
different rationales: the former by the rationale of integration while the latter by 
                                                                                                                                     
Schimmelfennig, ‘The Constitutionalization of the European Union. Explaining the 
Parliamentarization and Institutionalization of Human Rights’, available at 
www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Rittberger&Schimmelfennig%20Princeton%20memo.pdf. 
61 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491. 
62 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419. 
63 387/02 Berlusconi and others [2005] ECR  I-3565. 
64 36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609, par. 41. 
65 387/02 Berlusconi and others [2005] ECR I-3565. 
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 the rationale of constitutional diversification. As stressed, however, by Ruggeri66 
thanks to the hermeneutical channel represented by the preliminary ruling, the 
constitutional principles of the inner legal orders arise from their origin (national 
level) and become common sources of EU Law; then these common constitutional 
traditions come back to the origin in a new form when they are applied by the 
Court of Justice.  
This progressive communitarization of national fundamental principles can 
be seen as another limit for the EU law primacy, as the scholarship has stressed 
reading together Artt. I-5 (Art. 4 of EUT after the Reform Treaty of Lisbon) and I-
6 of the Constitutional Treaty (disappeared in the Reform Treaty of Lisbon): in 
Art. I-5 of the Constitutional Treaty, in fact, we can find the proof of the 
communitarization of the counter-limits theory as a result of the judicial dialogue 
between Constitutional Courts and Court of Justice.  
The model of Art. I-5 is undoubtedly represented by Art. 6 EUT (‘current’ 
version), which efficaciously described the closeness between common 
constitutional traditions and national fundamental principles: in this article, in 
fact, these two kinds of legal sources (common constitutional traditions67 and 
national fundamental principles) are mentioned in two subsequent paragraphs. 
It suffices to recall here the reference that the Art. 6 (‘current’ version), 
para. 2 makes to the common constitutional traditions, and the reference to the 
“national identities” of its Member States that is set in para. 3 of Art. 6. We argue 
that within a legal context, by the formula “national identities”, the European 
legislator meant the constitutional identities of the Member States, that is the 
counter-limits, as defined by national constitutional courts. In this sense we can 
say that Art. I-5 of the Constitutional Treaty has only expressly codified such an 
interpretation by speaking about “constitutional structure” and in this way it 
delivered the interpretation of the counter-limits to the Court of Justice.  
                                                 
66 A. Ruggeri, ‘“Tradizioni costituzionali comuni” e “controlimiti”, tra teoria delle fonti e teoria 
dell’interpretazione’, (2003) 1 Diritto Pubblico Comparato e Europeo, 102-120, the best example 
of such a dynamic is provided by the EC principle of proportionality. It was clearly “extracted” 
from the German legal tradition, although the classic three-step partition (Geeignetheit, 
Erforderlichkeit, Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung im engeren Sinne) elaborated by the German judges 
is rarely respected by the Court of Justice. Moreover the translation of the German principle in the 
supranational context has been enriched by the French experience of the “bilan avantages- coûts’” 
as elaborated in the Conseil d’Etat case-law. About this phenomenon see D. U. Galetta, ‘Il 
principio di proporzionalità comunitario e il suo effetto di spill over? negli ordinamenti nazionali’ 
(2005) Nuove Autonomie, 541-557. 
67About the common constitutional traditions as sources of EC Law see: A. Pizzorusso, ‘Common 
Constitutional Traditions in Europe as a Source of Community Law’ in A. Auer - J. D. Delley -M. 
Hottelier - G. Malinverni (eds.), Aux confins du droit – Essais en l’honneur du Professeur C.A 
Morand (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2001), 307-319. 
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 Despite this structural continuity between common constitutional 
traditions and counter-limits, it is possible to find other recent cases68 where the 
Court seems to accept a more “selective” vision of fundamental rights: 
 
Thus, unlike other fundamental rights enshrined in that Convention, such as the 
right to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, which admit of no restriction, neither the freedom of expression nor 
the freedom of assembly guaranteed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but 
must be viewed in relation to its social purpose. Consequently, the exercise of 
those rights may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to 
objectives of general interest and do not, taking account of the aim of the 
restrictions, constitute disproportionate and unacceptable interference, impairing 
the very substance of the rights guaranteed. 69 
 
In Schmidberger the Court of Justice distinguished between two groups of 
fundamental rights: the absolute rights (which admit of no restrictions) and other 
fundamental rights. Concerning the second category of rights, the Court of Justice 
admitted the necessity to evaluate through a case by case approach the 
proportionality of their possible restrictions. This selective and case by case 
approach seems to be in contrast with the very broad approach which the Court of 
Justice followed in Omega.70  
In conclusion, in Schmidberger this balance between fundamental and 
economic rights could be questionable and could appear incoherent with the Court 
of Justice case-law because it comes just before the Omega case. Recently the 
Court of Justice went back to the selective and case by case approach to the 
fundamental rights (conceived in Schmidberger) in Laval71 and Viking72 cases. 
In these cases, the Court of Justice recognized the fundamental right to 
collective action as integral part of EU Community law. This right can justify 
restrictions on the fundamental freedom of establishment or on the freedom to 
provide services guaranteed under the EU Treaty, in order to protect workers and 
their conditions of employment. The Court of Justice added that this action is 
legal ‘only if it pursues a legitimate aim such as the protection of workers’ and it 
has left the decision of legitimacy in this case up to the national courts to decide, 
balancing the rationale of market integration with the rationale of social policies.  
                                                 
68 112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, par. 80. 
69 See, to that effect, case 62/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-2575, paragraph 23, and 
case 404/92 P X v Commission [1994] ECR I-4737, paragraph 18. 
70 About Omega and Schmidberger see the wonderful piece by Alberto Alemanno ‘À la recherche 
d'un juste équilibre entre libertés fondamentales et droits fondamentaux dans le cadre du marché 
intérieur. Quelques réflexions à propos des arrêts Schmidberger et Omega’, (2004) 4 Revue du 
droit de l'Union Européenne, 709-751. 
71 341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd/Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet et a. [2007] ECR I-11767. 
72 438/05 The International Transport Workers' Federation and The Finnish Seamen's Union 
[2007] ECR I-10779.   
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 Concluding, the Court of Justice’s activity could be read as swinging 
between the two poles identified above (high level of integration and preservation 
of differences): following this reconstruction this mixture of acceleration and 
deceleration is explicable, as Morbidelli73 pointed out, by reading the different 
choices made by the Court in terms of proportionality, conceived as a 
costs/benefits analysis.  
The progressive “softening” of the primacy is accompanied by the unclear 
result of the contrast between national and supranational laws. In Simmenthal74 
the Court specified that the contrast between EC law and national law implies the 
invalidity and the inefficacy of the latter. 
As we have seen above, the Italian Constitutional Court contested the 
invalidity of the national law contrasting with EC law, by distinguishing between 
disapplication (figure of invalidity) and non-application (figure of inefficacy, 
which does not preclude the future application of the contested national act in 
other cases). As a form of partial concession, the Court of Justice stated in 
Imperial Chemical Industries (para. 34): 
 
When deciding an issue concerning a situation which lies outside the scope of 
Community law, the national court is not required, under Community law, either 
to interpret its legislation in a way conforming with Community law or to 
disapply that legislation. Where a particular provision must be disapplied in a 
situation covered by Community law, but that same provision could remain 
applicable to a situation not so covered, it is for the competent body of the State 
concerned to remove that legal uncertainty in so far as it might affect rights 
deriving from Community rule.75 
 
Another interesting profile is provided by the terminology of the Court of 
Justice: usually the Court of Justice does not use the term “supremacy” (in Costa 
Enel,76 for example, the Court of Justice used the words “primacy” or 
“precedence”). The only exceptions in the Court of Justice’s case-law are 
represented by cases like Walt Wilhelm77 and Leonesio.78 Despite this 
terminological absence in the text of the Court of Justice judgements and in the 
Treaties, the notion of supremacy has entered the common language of lawmakers 
                                                 
73 G. Morbidelli, ‘La tutela dei diritti tra la Corte del Lussemburgo e Corte Costituzionale’, in G. 
Morbidelli - F. Donati (eds.), Una costituzione per l’Unione europea (Giappichelli, 2006), 9, 23-
24.  
74 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR, 629. 
75 264/96 Imperial Chemical Industries [1998] ECR I-4695. 
76 6/64 Costa Enel [1964] ECR, 1141. 
77 14/68 Walt Wilhelm [1969] ECR 1. 
78 93/71 Leonesio [1972] ECR 287. See D. Piquani, ‘Supremacy of European Law revisited: New 
developments in the context of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’, paper presented 
at the VII World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional law, Athens, 11-15 
June 2007, available at www.enelsyn.gr/papers/w4/Paper%20by%20Darinka%20Piqani.pdf  
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 and scholars: the best example of this trend is confirmed by the debate about Art. 
I-6 of the Constitutional Treaty (disappeared in the Reform Treaty of Lisbon), that 
would have crystallised the so-called “supremacy clause”. The word 
“supremacy”, in fact, is borrowed from the term used by the American 
Constitution and presumes the existence of a perfect federal model and of a 
normative “monism”. An evident exception to this ‘linguistic trend’ is provided 
by the French scholarship which has preferred to use the word ‘primauté’ instead 
of ‘suprématie’in order to describe the priority given to the EC law.79  
Unlike classical federal experiences, the ‘secret’80 of the European 
Communities lies in the ‘constitutional tolerance’81 and the consequence of such a 
peculiarity is the impossibility of resolving the antinomies in terms of invalidity, 
as the Constitutional courts have maintained for many years. 
Constitutional tolerance, in fact, implies a form of voluntary obedience to 
the EC law, which cannot be inferred by the existence of a hierarchy between 
legal orders. 
Being forced to deal with this constitutional diversity, the Court of Justice 
has adopted a strategy that reminds us of the attitude of other international Courts, 
using a sort of margin of appreciation doctrine. ‘The doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation, as developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), is 
an interpretational tool by which the court can delineate between what is properly 
a matter for each community to decide at the local level and what is so 
fundamental that the same requirements are imposed on every State, regardless of 
variations in culture.’82 This doctrine requires a certain attention to the legislative 
and factual situation of the national order involved in the case, and implies the 
need - for the Court of Justice - to immerge itself in the constitutional structure of 
the national laws in order to do a preventive evaluation of its judgments.  
This would require a case-by-case approach by the Court of Justice and a 
more frequent use of comparative law tools before the EC judge. 
We can find a confirmation of such an approach in the latest judgements 
dealing with the issue of State liability caused by the breach of EC law. In Konle 
(para. 64)83: 
                                                 
79 But about this point see the language used by the French scholars with regard to the recent 
Arcelor judgment (Conseil d’Etat, Assemblée Société Arcelor et autres, 8 février 2007, available 
at www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/jurispd/index_ac_ld0706.shtml ). 
80 In Bagehot’s meaning: W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (Cambridge, 2001) 8. 
81 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe's Sonderweg’ (2000) Harvard Jean 
Monnet Paper available at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/001001.html  
82A. A. Ostrovsky, ‘What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? How the Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine Preserves Core Human Rights within Cultural Diversity and Legitimises 
International Human Rights Tribunals’, (2005) 1 Hanse Law Review, 47-64. 
83 302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I-3099. 
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 The answer to the fourth question must therefore be that, in Member States with 
a federal structure, reparation for damage caused to individuals by national 
measures taken in breach of Community law need not necessarily be provided by 
the federal State in order for the obligations of the Member State concerned 
under Community law to be fulfilled. 
 
At the same time, it is possible to read Grant84 and P v S85 coherently by 
looking at the different impact of the Court of Justice’s decisions on the factual 
background. In those cases it was self-evident that the acknowledgement of rights 
to homosexual couples would have had much worse financial repercussions on the 
Member States than those caused by the possible acknowledgement of 
transsexuals’ rights. Consequently, such a decision would have been less 
understood by the States. 
These are only two examples of the attention paid by the Court of Justice 
to the constitutional structures of the Member States and they can be seen as a 
strong hint of a judicial comity attitude by the Court. 
 
IV Final remarks of the section - A glance at sentenza No. 102/2008 
 
To conclude, we observe that the Court of Justice has sometimes reacted strongly 
to Constitutional Courts’ strategy, by denying the possibility for the Constitutional 
Court to refuse the preliminary ruling; by denying the possibility that Italian acts 
contrasting with EC law could be valid; by denying the possibility to build some 
ultimate barriers (even though of constitutional degree) against the penetration of 
EC law. 
In other cases the Court of Justice approached the Constitutional Courts 
showing the ripeness of its legal system (the recognition of the fundamental rights 
in Nold,86 Stauder,87Omega88) in order to gain the trust of the Constitutional 
Courts. Such an alternation of soft means (persuasion) and hard means 
(supremacy without exceptions) in the Court of Justice’s activity is the result of 
two forces: constitutional tolerance and evolving dynamism.89 In the Court of 
Justice’s case-law it is not possible arrange this scheme on a chronological 
                                                 
84 249/96 Grant c. South west trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-621. 
85 13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143. See O. Pollicino,  ‘Legal 
Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of the Principle of Equality Between Judicial 
Activism and Self-restraint’, (2004) 5 German Law Journal, 283-317. 
86 4/73 Nold 1973 [1975] ECR 491. 
87 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm, [1969] ECR 419. 
88 36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609. 
89 O. Pollicino, ‘Against the idea of “Americanization” of European judicature in the context of the 
new era of judicial globalization’, (2007) 1 Panóptica, 407-440; G. Martinico - O. Pollicino, 
‘Between constitutional tolerance and judicial activism: the “specificity” of the European judicial 
law’ (2008) 1 European Journal of Law Reform, 97-125. 
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 distinction (as the closeness in time of decisions which are so different proves) 
that would imply an “activist” first stage and a “persuasive” second stage. From 
the national point of view, the Constitutional Courts try to defend their 
jurisdiction and prerogatives, by inventing complicated mechanisms (dual 
preliminarity; erga omnes effects of the interpretative rulings; disapplication vs. 
non application; counter-limits) in order to balance the rationale of the 
jurisdictional dialogue and the rationale of the constitutional identity. The result of 
this interlacement is a situation of obliging instability characterized by a de facto 
synergy, despite formal and rhetorical calls for contrast. 
Before turning to the next part of our essay, it is worth describing the 
recent behaviour of the Italian Constitutional Court. On April 15, 2008,90 for the 
first time in its history, the Italian Constitutional Court agreed to raise a 
preliminary question to the Court of Justice, adopting a decision presenting at the 
same time features of continuity and rupture with regard to the previous case-law. 
A continuity point is represented by the fact that the decisive criterion 
upon which the Constitutional Court decides to handle this EC procedure lies in 
the distinction between principaliter and incidenter proceedings.91 The 2008 
decision was drawn in a principaliter proceedings, this meaning that the Italian 
Constitutional Court acted as the “true” judge of the (abstract) controversy, as 
opposed to the incidenter proceedings, where the “true” judge of the real dispute 
is the referring judge. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court was ready to 
acknowledge for the first time that it falls under the scope of the definition of 
“court or tribunal” of Art. 234 ECT (rupture), but only in the case of a 
principaliter proceedings (continuity); and this exception comes from the past. 
It is usually a task of the ordinary judge to review the consistency between 
domestic law and EC law, rather than a Constitutional Court’s duty. However, in 
two old decisions (see sentenze No. 384/1994 and No. 94/1995), the Italian 
Constitutional Court already acknowledged that, since in the principaliter 
proceedings there is not an ordinary judge to carry out this task, the refusal by the 
Constitutional Court do so would have resulted in a dangerous gap in the 
protection of rights, and a breach of the principle of legal certainty. 
                                                 
90  Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 102/2008, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
91 The principaliter proceedings are related to claims lodged directly by the Central Government 
or by the Regions before the Constitutional Court. The incidenter proceedings, on the contrary, 
consist of claims filed by an ordinary judge (known as judge a quo, a Latin expression meaning 
"from which", referring to the fact that the question stems "from" the judge) who has a doubt on 
the constitutionality on a national provision he should apply. The former is a direct review of a 
piece of legislation which also entails an abstract nature, whereas the latter is a form of indirect 
review of the challenged provisions, that bears a concrete nature (i.e., the outcome of the 
constitutionality review is decisive for the settlement of the dispute pending before the referring 
judge). 
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 Another consideration may be useful as regards the role of the ordinary 
judges: their contribution is important to the functioning of both the incidenter 
proceedings before the Italian Constitutional Court and the preliminary reference 
mechanism before the European Court of Justice: they are the doorkeepers 
entrusted with the initiation of both proceedings, and their cooperation is essential 
for the work of both the “higher” Courts. 
We saw above that the technique of dual preliminarity92 is based upon a 
judicial triangle: the national referring judge is due to raise two related questions 
to the European Court of Justice and to the Constitutional Court. As obvious, this 
can be true only in the framework of the incidenter proceedings; now that a 
formal channel of cooperation (the use of Art. 234 ECT) was opened in relation to 
the principaliter proceedings we can observe how the two instruments of dialogue 
coexist, at different levels: the institutional procedure and the hidden technique.93 
This double approach reflects the double temptation of the Constitutional 
Court: on one hand it still wants to avoid a direct clash with a powerful 
competitor, and keeps implementing the dialogue incognito; on the other hand it 
would like to enter the interpretive arena in order to influence the outcome of the 
ECJ’s construction of EC law, that more and more often affects the content and 
the interpretation of domestic EC-related law. 
 
V An international law attempt to re-define and interpret these praxes 
 
After giving this overview on the ever-evolving relationship between the Court of 
Justice and national constitutional courts, we will now try to form a possible 
interpretation of this set of facts using instruments drawn from traditional 
international law studies. 
Moreover, we would like to fully merge the federal and the international 
law views on the European Union and Community: whereas hierarchical and/or 
constitutional reconstructions sometimes fall short of justifying the institutional 
competition between national courts and the Court of Justice,94 the international 
law approach alone would erroneously ignore the supremacy discourse, that 
                                                 
92 See above in Section II. 
93 The decision is also relevant as regards two other hidden techniques: whilst it seems to overlook 
the distinction between non-application and disapplication (the “disapplying” action was 
mentioned), it agrees upon the theoretical grounds of the separation between primacy and 
supremacy, when it gives a description of the domestic and supranational legal orders as being two 
autonomous systems, although integrated and coordinated. 
94 On the concept of interpretive competition between judicial bodies, see K. Alter, ‘Explaining 
National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of 
Legal Integration’, in A. Slaughter - A .Stone Sweet - J. H. H. Weiler (eds), The European Court 
and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in its Social Context (Oxford, 
1997), 227-252 
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 differentiates the EC legal order from the flattened international law system, in 
which actors are not supposed to depend on each other, but to bear equal powers. 
Let us start by noting that many among the techniques we have described 
above can be easily traced back to some general principles of (international) 
procedural law.95 We refer here to the principles of lis alibi pendens, of ne bis in 
idem, of res judicata, of electā unā viā, of estoppel. Whereas similar principles 
are easy to recognize and are commonly acknowledged within single legal orders, 
their force starts to fade when required to be effective across different systems.96 
In particular, whilst it can be questionable – at the state level – whether 
these principles of judicial coordination are binding, it is common to deem that 
they are not, when applied to a multilayered scenario. This preliminary 
consideration helps us to understand two things about this paper: first, all the 
dialogic techniques we have described so far are of a voluntary nature,97 and 
therefore develop within a framework of spontaneous practices. Secondly, this 
cooperative attitude, being based more on a need for peaceful collaboration rather 
than on a formal obligation, closely resembles the definition of judicial comity,98 
as employed in international law theory.99 
                                                 
95 See extensively A. Gattini, ‘Un regard procédural sur la fragmentation du droit international’ 
(2006) 110 RGDIP, 303, and A. Reinisch, ‘The use and limits of res judicata and lis pendens as 
procedural tools to avoid conflicting dispute settlement outcomes’, (2004) 3 Journal of Law and 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 37. Regarding the applicability of procedural 
principles drawn from private international law studies, we share P. M. Dupuy remarks, see 
‘L’Unité d’Application du Droit International à l’Echelle Globale et Responsabilité des Juges’, 
(2008) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies, 21. 
96 See on this point F. Snyder, ‘Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and 
EU Law’, (1999) 5 European Law Journal, 334, 374, where the Author refers to what we roughly 
define here ‘systems’ by using the lightening concept of ‘sites of governance’. After describing 
their features, their functions and their somehow shapeless nature, the Author concludes by 
confirming the insufficiency of conflict of norms rules to discipline their mutual relationships: ‘the 
various sites [of governance] are not all necessarily hierarchically ordered in relation to each other. 
Instead, they demonstrate many other types of interrelationships, sometimes hierarchical, 
sometimes not, sometimes competing, sometimes collaborating. In other words, even when viewed 
very broadly, they do not make up a legal system.’ In our paper we investigate those 
interrelationships that places themselves on the borderline between legally bound praxes and 
collaborating behaviours, still trying to figure out the actual (strategic) motivations that cause 
them. 
97 As P. M. Dupuy states (see L’Unité cit., 1): ‘L’examen de la structure actuelle des relations 
entre juridiction internes et internationales d’une part, internationales entre elles d’autre part, 
conduit en tout cas à la conclusion qu’au-delà de toutes les institutions juridiques, c’est d’abord 
dans la tète des juges eux-mêmes que se résout la question.’ Given the lack of specific provisions, 
it rests with the judge to choose whether to take care of the unity of international law, and of the 
consistency of its application. 
98 As J. Allard and A. Garapon recalls, the word comity comes from the Latin “comitas gentium”, 
an expression referring to the benevolence and generosity of the peoples, a sort of international 
courtesy, see Les juges dans la mondialisation - la nouvelle révolution du droit, (2005) Editions du 
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 We prefer here to rely on the concept of comity in the rendition(s) given 
by international law scholars, in order to elude the labyrinth of all the possible 
meanings comity can take in its different national versions.100 We will then try to 
study the relationship between the Court of Justice and national constitutional 
courts according to a new and intentionally dualistic model. 
Finally, a comparison will be sketched between the behaviour carried out 
by the Court of Justice towards national courts and the behaviour showed to 
international courts or tribunals, when the interpretation of EC law has been at 
stake.101 The difference between these two situations depends (we will try to 
support this statement) less on the different connection that links the actors (parts 
of the same integrated order or belonging to different orders) than on the different 
strategy the Court of Justice wants to pursue (silent tolerance or hostile defence of 
its prerogatives). 
 
VI The ‘As Long As’ mechanism as a comity device 
 
Is there a possibility to extract an essential rationale from the Solange doctrine, 
and to use it as the foundation for an inter-level comity between judiciary 
bodies?102 There is no need here to rehearse the meaning underlying the very well 
known as long as adage. Let us just recall briefly how the German Constitutional 
Court conceded a general rebuttable presumption of constitutionality to the EC 
                                                                                                                                     
Seuil. See also M. Delmas Marty, Le relatif et l'universel. Les forces imaginantes du droit, (2004) 
Editions du Seuil, and Le pluralisme ordonné, (2006) Editions du Seuil, Parigi, and A. M. 
Slaugther, ‘A Global Community of Courts’, (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal, 191. 
99 See Y. Shany, ‘Jurisdictional Competition between National and International Courts: Could 
International Jurisdiction-Regulating Rules Apply?’, (2006) Hebrew University International Law 
Research Paper No. 02-06, 54: ‘the comity framework of analysis seems to provide […] a more 
adequate method of balancing between the competing interests of the national and international 
legal system than rigid pro-integration rules, such as res judicata or lis alibi pendens.’ 
100 We will provide below narrower and more opportune definitions of comity, suffice it here to 
recall the first formulation Justice Gray gave in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 40 L. Ed. 95, 16 S. 
Ct. 139 (1895): ‘Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation […] nor of 
mere courtesy and good will […]. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its 
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard to both 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who 
are under the protection of its laws.’ For an overview of the concept, see J. Paul, ‘Comity in 
International Law’, (1991) 32 Harvard International Law Journal, 1. 
101 On the point, see M. Bronckers, ‘The Relationship of EC Courts with Other International 
Tribunals: Non-committal, Respectful or Submissive?’, (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review, 
601. 
102 I owe many of the ideas developed in this paragraph to E. U. Petersmann’s teaching, see e.g. 
the recent essay ‘Do Judges Meet their Constitutional Obligation to Settle Disputes in Conformity 
with ‘Principles of Justice and International Law’?’, (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies. 
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 legislation, giving up the possible intention to scrutinize every piece of EC 
legislation dealing with fundamental rights.103 
This technique has been recognized to be of a surprisingly deferential 
nature, despite its smart formulation. It can easily be read as an act of surrender 
signed by the national court in the moment it realizes that the interpretive 
competition with the Court of Justice is a non-convenient strategy. Moreover it is 
a smooth escape from the impasse resulting from the Constitutional Court’s 
refusal to use Art. 234 EC. 
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights, in the Bosphorous 
case,104 has recently refused to second-guess an EC regulation105 which 
implemented a UN Security Council resolution,106 although the content of the 
regulation was openly restrictive of a fundamental right, namely property right. 
By doing this, the ECHR has recognized the limitative effect the EC act 
had on a basic right, but such a consideration was balanced by the importance of 
the purpose that determined this intentional restriction, and by the fact that the 
European Community system, overall, could guarantee a system of fundamental 
rights’ safeguard which is comparable to that provided by the European 
Convention of Human Rights.107 The same formula108 (as long as) is used here to 
introduce a similar mechanism: there is a prima facie presumption that prevents a 
clash between jurisdictions and this presumption regards the protection of 
fundamental rights.109 Para. 155 of the judgment reads, in fact: 
                                                 
103 See BverfGE 73, 339, cit. 
104 See Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v.Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 (30 June 2005). 
105 See Council Regulation (EEC) No 990/93 of 26 April 1993 concerning trade between the 
European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro), OJ L 102, 28 April 1993, 14. 
106 See UN Security Council resolution No. 820 of 17 April 1993. 
107 The ECHR fails in addressing directly the imperative nature of the Security Council resolution 
to which the regulation conformed: the natural consequence of the reasoning held by the 
Strasbourg Court would have then been to verify whether the UN system itself could be deemed to 
offer an ‘equivalent protection’ of fundamental rights. See F. Hoffmeister, ‘Comment to 
Bosphorous Hava Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirket v. Ireland. App. 45036/98’, (2006) 100 
American Journal of International Law, 442, 448. 
108 This curiosity has also been noted by S. Douglas-Scott, in his comment on the decision 
‘Bosphorous Hava Yollari Turzim Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland’, (2006) 43 Common 
Market Law Review, 243, 246. It is not a case that the Author state, ibid, that the EctHR appears to 
desire a comity relationship between the courts, or at least a pattern of co-operation. See also N. 
Lavranos, ‘Das So-Lange-Prinzip im Verhältnis von EGMR und EuGH’, (2006) 41 European 
Review, 79. 
109 In para. 156 this presumption is explained: by merely implementing obligations flowing from 
the organization it is part of, a State is presumed to be complying the Convention’s requirements. 
Such a presumption can be rebutted if the protection provided by the organization, and carried out 
by the State, were to be manifestly deficient. ‘In such cases, the interest of international co-
operation would be outweighed by the Convention's role as a “constitutional instrument of 
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 In the Court's view, State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations 
is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect 
fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the 
mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered 
at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides (...). By 
“equivalent” the Court means “comparable”: any requirement that the 
organisation's protection be “identical” could run counter to the interest of 
international cooperation pursued (...). However, any such finding of equivalence 
could not be final and would be susceptible to review in the light of any relevant 
change in fundamental rights' protection (our italic). 
 
Neither the European Court of Human Rights nor the German 
Constitutional Court felt that a diverging interpretation on the protection of 
fundamental rights, which is probably the most typical among their prerogative 
tasks, entitled them to intervene and reaffirm their primacy over the European 
Community order. Paradoxically, the safeguard of core rights, far from being the 
reason for the application of the counter-limit, was used as the harmonizing 
platform, and either tribunal sacrificed its own particular conception110 to pledge 
allegiance to the Court of Justice, or to give it support.111 
This is, in our opinion, a clear example of the ‘legitimation through human 
rights’ advocated by J. Habermas,112 the kind of legitimation through which 
practices that ‘deserve recognition’ can be identified.113 
Is this courteous practice something we can categorise, at least roughly? 
Here is where we must refer to international law concept of comity that we have 
mentioned above. 
Before criticising its content, let us remind how comity is supposed to 
work in the harmonization of independent tribunals’ action, by quoting a 1985 
                                                                                                                                     
European public order” in the field of human rights (Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 
judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, § 75).’ This wording recalls the counter-limit 
rhetoric, in which reactions are foreseen just in case of patent infringement of fundamental values. 
110 As S. Douglas-Scott sharply concludes, see Bosphorous cit., 253. 
111 According to E. U. Petersmann (see Do Judges cit., 21) the Solange mechanism that we have 
described ‘should serve as a model for ‘conditional cooperation’ among international courts and 
national courts also in international economic law, environmental law and human rights law 
beyond Europe’. In addition, see the reasoning by N. Lavranos (quoted ibidem, 35 fn 99, from a 
forthcoming essay): the Author argues that the Solange method, and comity in general, could be 
conceived as the content of a peculiar obligation of the judge, that of settling a single dispute 
according to justice principles. 
112 See J. Habermas, ‘Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights’ in id, The Postnational 
Constellation, (Cambridge, 2001), 113.  
113 See C. Joerges, ‘Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy’ (2005) EUI Working Paper LAW 
No. 2005/12, available at www.iue.it, 21: ‘Deliberative Supranationalism II [based on governance 
rather than normative mechanisms] has to respect and to organize diversity, just as European 
conflict of laws does. Only then can it ensure the development of law-mediated governance 
practices and conflict resolutions which ‘deserve recognition.’ [Habermas formula]’. 
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 decision handed down by a tribunal applying ICSID (International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes) law: 
 
When the jurisdictions of two unrelated and independent tribunals extend to the 
same dispute, there is no rule of international law which prevents either tribunal 
from exercising its jurisdiction. However, in the interest of international judicial 
order, either of the tribunals may, in its discretion and as a matter of comity, 
decide to stay the exercise of its jurisdiction pending a decision by the other 
tribunal.114 
 
Comity, or judiciary courtesy, are nevertheless shifty concepts; as S. 
Maljean Dubois and J.C. Martine fairly state, ‘[l]a justification morale tirée du 
«mutual respect» et de la «comity» […] est particulièrement incertaine et 
contingente; elle ne repose que sur l’appréciation discrétionnaire de 
considérations d’opportunité.’115 This clear-cut consideration, that blends 
opportunism and discretion as the basic ingredients of comity, serves us better 
than the politically incorrect ‘best definition’ given in 1915 by A.M. Brown, 
according to which comity is not but a form of ‘caprice.’116 
Our analysis intends to take these criticisms into consideration, not to run 
the risk of blindly entrusting the comity device with our conclusive remarks. In 
fact, given that neither the constitutional integration (whose parameters are far 
from being univocally identifiable) nor the interjudicial comity are reliable 
parameters to solve jurisdictional conflicts according to a foreseeable legal rule 
(were it hierarchic or coordinative),117 we must then follow a different pattern. 
Such a pattern could be used to envisage interpretative monopoly and exclusive 
authority as the real interests at stake.118 
                                                 
114 See SPP v Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction I, 27 November 1985, 3 ICSID Reports 121, 129. 
115 See S. Maljean Dubois and J.C. Martine, ‘L’affaire de l’Usine Mox devant les tribunaux 
internationaux’ (2007) 134, JDI, 438, 450. 
116 See A.M. Brown, ‘Comity in the Federal Courts’, (1915) 28 Harvard Law Review, 589, 589: ‘it 
is perhaps true that no more definite principle than caprice can be said, on the whole, to govern the 
attitude of the courts of one nation towards those of another.’ 
117 The abandonment of the hierarchical constitutional criterion to rule conflicts of laws and 
jurisdiction (in favour of proceduralisation and methodology) is sharply described in R. Nickel, 
‘The Riddle of Unitas in Diversitas: from Conflict of Laws to Administrative Constitutionalism?’ 
(2005) EUI Working Paper cit., 45, 45. 
118 Another model could be used, if we try to avoid the unreliability of comity as a prescriptive 
criterion, because of its discretionary and unforeseeable character. A. Rosas has built one in its 
article ‘The European Court of Justice in Context: Forms and Patterns of Judicial Dialogue’, 
(2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies. 15. The Author makes a distinction, among those non 
bound behaviours inspired by comity, based to their different degree of compulsoriness: 
‘Sometimes a ‘must’ or a ‘shall’ becomes a ‘should’. An example of a ‘should’ relationship exists 
in my view between the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights; especially in 
what I called horizontal judicial dialogue [...], it is at most a question of a ‘may.’’ The mention to 
the ‘horizontal dialogue’ refers to one of the category Rosas describes in this differentiation, which 
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 VII The struggle for survival and for interpretive monopoly 
 
Let us now turn to analysing the Court of Justice’s behaviour in what we shall call 
the interpretive competition among independent courts. Another attitude was 
shown by the Court of Justice towards international courts menacing its 
monopoly, something that does not match the relaxed and obliging dialogue we 
have described taking place between the European Court and national 
constitutional tribunals. 
When the European Economic Area was founded,119 a tribunal was to be 
established for the settlement of disputes arising between Parties: this new EEA 
Court was supposed to have a mixed jurisdiction, encompassing conflicts founded 
on either EEA or relevant EC provisions.120 Due to the uncertain consequences 
this mixed system could trigger, the Commission requested the Court’s opinion on 
this new judicial body, under Article 228(6) EC.121 
The Court of Justice issued the Opinion 1/91,122 whose core statement was 
set in para. 51: ‘The system of judicial supervision which the [EEA] Agreement 
proposes to set up is incompatible with the EEC Treaty.’ 
The main argument supporting this clear rebuttal resides in the non-
renounceable need for legal homogeneity: a duplication of the set of applicable 
norms and a duplication of the bodies charged with their adjudication could not 
lead to a consistent order;123 but the real concern of the Court of Justice was 
clearly the risk of being bound by the decisions of a newcomer (the EEA 
                                                                                                                                     
reflects the changeable obligatoriness of judges’ action. J. Allard and A. Garapon, in their Les 
juges dans la mondialisation (Seuil, 2005), give an effective description of the comity concept, 
referring as well to its etymologic origin (the comitas gentium of Roman Law), and put it halfway 
between information and coactions. Furthermore, they contrast comity with competitiveness, in 
accordance with a model that we use in this article, and that has been vastly described by A. M. 
Slaughter, in her A new world order (Princeton University Press, 2004). 
119 After the signature of the Agreement Creating a European Economic Area, 2 May 1992. 
120 For a detailed review of the facts we are describing, see extensively B. Brandtner, ‘The 
‘Drama’ of the EEA: Comments on Opinions 1/91 and 1/92’, (1992) 3 European Journal of 
International Law, 300. 
121 Art. 228(6) EC. 
122 Opinion 1/91, ‘Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area’, O.J. (No. C110) 1. 
123 See the recital No. 35 of the 1/91 Opinion, which clearly states how the EEA Court competence 
would be ‘likely […] to affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties and, hence, 
the autonomy of the Community legal order, respect of which must be assured by the Court of 
Justice pursuant to Article 164 of the EEC Treaty [now art. 239]. This exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice is confirmed by Article 219 [now art. 292] of the EEC Treaty, under which 
Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of 
that Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for in the Treaty.’ 
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 Court):124 in this case the macroeconomic simile is more than appropriate: the 
Court attained its monopoly position by obstructing the competition. 
The consequence of the Court of Justice’s Opinion was the re-negotiation 
of the EEA, and the inclusion in the new version of the Agreement of several 
clauses of coordination between the new EFTA Court and the Court of Justice, 
whose main effect is to tie to the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence both this new 
tribunal and the EEA Joint Committee, a mixed ‘forum in which views are 
exchanged and decisions are taken by consensus to incorporate Community 
legislation into the EEA Agreement.’125 The Court of Justice gave its consent to 
the new system, by issuing its 1/92 Opinion.126 
The relationship between the WTO quasi-judicial dispute settlement 
mechanism and the Court of Justice presents similar features, even if this latter 
adopts a different legal reasoning in attempting to avoid DSB decision to be 
directly invoked before the Luxembourg Court. In particular, the Court of Justice 
has declared127 that the direct effect of a decision issued by the Panel or the 
Appellate Body would undermine the margin of discretion that WTO Parties 
enjoy when they choose how to settle a dispute, because alternative ways of 
resolution would be ruled out if the EC act deemed illegal in the WTO framework 
were directly to be considered non-applicable in the EC framework.128 
It should nevertheless be maintained that, in case the EC were not to 
comply with a DSB decision by amending its legislation, the Court of Justice 
itself should conform to the DSB finding its decision on the validity of the 
opposed act.129 
                                                 
124 As B. Brandtner (The Drama cit., 309) notes. The decisions of the EEA Court would have had 
binding force on all EC institutions, including the Court of Justice, see recital 37 of the 1/91 
Opinion. Moreover, the ECJ’s opposition to the establishment of the EEA Court is less based on 
considerations of this latter’s composition (as in Opinion 1/76, dealing on the establishment of a 
mixed Swiss – Court of Justice Tribunal) than on doubts about its very existence. 
125 See the related webpage, accessible through the EFTA website at: 
http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/ 
EuropeanEconomicArea/institutions/EEAJointCommittee 
126 See Opinion 1/92 of 10 April 1992, ‘Draft agreement relating to the creation of the European 
Economic Area’, O.J. (No. C136) 1. 
127 377/02 NV Firma Leon Van Parys v Belgisch Interventie - an Restitutiebureau [2005] ECR I-
1465, para. 42; 149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395, para. 36-40. 
128 See Art. 22 of DSU, in particular para. 2 and 8. Among the many contributions available on the 
WTO – EC issue, see M. Recanati, ‘Sugli effetti delle decisioni dell’organo di conciliazione 
dell’OMC nell’ordinamento comunitario’, (2007) 12 Diritto dell’Unione Europea, 437. 
129 See the Opinion of Advocate General A. Tizzano, delivered on 18 November 2004 Case 377/02 
cit., para. 106: ‘since the DSB decision […] found that the regime was not consistent with those 
[WTO] rules, it follows that the Court, which is required to determine the matter, has no 
alternative but to reach a negative conclusion, that is to say to declare that the acts on which the 
regime in question is based are invalid.’ 
26
Global Jurist, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 3 (Advances), Art. 7
http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol8/iss3/art7
 It is in the WTO DSM – Court of Justice case that we will probably test in 
the near future the real character of the Court of Justice interpretive policy. Being 
that the WTO tribunals are ‘uninterested’ in such a need for monopoly felt by the 
Court of Justice,130 let alone bound by any obligation to support it, the Court of 
Justice will have to find a balanced way to fully recognise the importance of the 
DSB case-law, without giving up too much of its power.131 
We can see in the Portugal – Van Parys jurisprudence another clear 
example of a traditional Court of Justice’s strategy, ie the introduction of a 
controversial finding (in this case, the WTO decisions’ lack of direct 
effectiveness)132 coupled with some circumstantial qualifications (in this case, the 
safeguard of alternative techniques of dispute resolution) that should soften the 
impact of the new doctrine, by giving the impression that in different 
circumstances such a new trend will not apply.133 
It is possible that in the future the Court will discard these specifications to 
adopt a fully operative version of its view, but if that is the case it will have to 
dare the authority of the WTO dispute settlement system, which is far bigger than 
those of the EEA Court or the ITLOS Tribunal (see below).134 
                                                 
130 And stated in Artt. 220 and 234 of the EC Treaty. 
131 It is worth here to remind that Art. 23 of the DSU of the WTO provides for ‘exclusive 
jurisdiction’ of the DSB on WTO law disputes, as art. 292 CE provides for Court of Justice’s 
‘exclusive jurisdiction’ on EC law disputes. Although the Court has shown its tendency to 
misappropriate jurisdiction on mixed competences, we do not think that the DSB will easily back 
this trend, if asked to renounce is monopoly over WTO law. This scenario is similar to the German 
Constitutional Court – Court of Justice relationship, described by R. Stith, ‘Securing the Rule of 
Law through Interpretive Pluralism: An Argument from Comparative Law’ (2007) NYU Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 1/07, 38: as neither court is certain in advance of its own victory in case of 
clash, ‘no resistance has ever actually occurred, it has only been threatened.’ 
132 For a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between WTO law and the EC legal order, see 
F. Snyder, ‘The Gatekeepers: The European Courts and WTO Law’, (2003) 40 Common Market 
Law Review, 313-367. 
133 See how T.C. Hartley describes this process in The foundations of European Community Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2003), 81: ‘a common tactic by the Court is to introduce a new doctrine 
gradually: in the first case that comes before it, it will establish the doctrine as a general principle, 
and if there are not too many protests, it will be reaffirmed in later cases: the qualifications can 
then be whittled away and the whole of the doctrine revealed.’ See also O. Pollicino, Legal 
Reasoning cit., 311, and K. Alter, ‘Who Are the ‘‘Masters of the Treaty’’?: European 
Governments and the European Court of Justice’, (1998) 52 International Organizations, 121, 
133, for further comments on this passage. For a description of a similar but symmetric tactic 
(consisting of the avoidance of the direct effect problem, allegedly due to the presence of specific 
circumstances, which concealed instead the nascent intent not to concede WTO decisions a direct 
effect in the EC system) see F. Snyder, The Gatekeepers cit., 335-339. 
134 In P. Egli, ‘Leon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB). Case C-
377/02’, (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law, 449, 454 the Author recalls how the 
Court of Justice did not allow the WTO to set of standards on which EC acts could be reviewed: 
EC legality could not be set by non-EC actors; see also A. Antoniadis, ‘The European Union and 
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 More recently the Court of Justice harshly condemned Ireland135 for 
having submitted a dispute with the United Kingdom to an international 
tribunal,136 instead of referring to the European Court: that was perceived as an 
attempt to elude the exclusive monopoly that the Court of Justice has over the 
interpretation and application of EC law, even in cases where the facts at issue are 
only partially regulated by its norms (mixed agreements). As the Court itself 
distinctly states in the Mox Plant decision, 
 
an international agreement […] cannot affect the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Court in regard to the resolution of disputes between Member States concerning 
the interpretation and application of Community law.137 
 
In this case, again, the Court showed its willingness to reassess the 
absolute relevance of a principle (its exclusive jurisdiction) that has in fact a 
relative (internal) value: formally speaking, in fact, the prohibition referred to in 
Art. 292 is binding only within the EC system.138 
We can easily observe how the Court preferred to centralise the 
jurisdiction, rather than to pay attention to the specialisation of any other 
concurrent forum; by doing this the Court neglected construction of a possible 
‘judiciary federalism’.139 In fact, the Court sanctioned the reciprocal exclusion of 
                                                                                                                                     
WTO law, a nexus of reactive, coactive, and proactive approaches’, (2007) 6 World Trade Review, 
45, 82. The Author notes, recalling the Opinion 1/91 precedent, how the Court of Justice while 
treating the DSB issue has to ‘perform between two competing considerations: the supremacy of 
international law and the supremacy of Community law.’ 
135 See N. Lavranos, ‘The MOX Plant and IJzeren Rijn Disputes: Which Court Is the Supreme 
Arbiter?’, (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law, 223; P. J. Cardwell and D. French, 
‘Who decides? The Court of Justice’s judgment on jurisdiction in the MOX Plant case’, (2007) 19 
Journal of Environmental Law, 121, 123. 
136 Namely the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), not to be confused with the 
arbitral tribunal established under the OSPAR Convention, that issued a decision the same facts, or 
the arbitral tribunal established under Annex VII (Art. 287.5) of UNCLOS, that decided instead to 
apply comity, and restrain from deciding the case. 
137 459/03 European Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635, para. 132. 
138 See F. Casolari, ‘La sentenza MOX: la Corte di giustizia delle Comunità europee torna ad 
occuparsi dei rapporti tra ordinamento comunitario ed ordinamento internazionale’, (2007) 12 
Diritto dell’Unione Europea, 327, 355. 
139 In a ‘judiciary federalism’ structure the specialization and the ‘proximity’ of a tribunal to the 
matter at stake and to the parties of the dispute could serve as a criterion to assign the jurisdiction 
to a particular tribunal, see P. M. Dupuy, L’Unité cit., 2. This simile with the federal system could 
lead to accept another image, that of judicial subsidiarity, a concept which is embodied, for 
instance, in the wording of Art. 1 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
according to which the Court ‘and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.’ The 
system of protection of fundamental rights set out by the ECvHR is inspired by the subsidiarity 
principle as well, see the remarks made by the former president of the ECtHR L. Wildhaberl, in A 
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 two overlapping jurisdictions, rather than recognizing the competence of both, and 
a criterion to follow in order to choose the more opportune between them. 
 
VIII Possible perspectives: the Court of Justice role and its fading integrative 
mission 
 
It is worth noting here how the recent enlargement of the EC membership has 
triggered significant changes in the Court of Justice’s structures and functioning. 
New judges joined the Court of Justice line-up, judges either coming from new 
Member Countries or being appointed to replace an exiting judge. New Advocates 
General were appointed as well. The new set up of the Court could conceal a new 
direction of its action. 
Judges from new Member States could have missed the integration 
training that took place in the last half century, and could ignore the integration 
mission that the Court of Justice had in the past.140 New Courts (rectius, the Court 
in its future formations) will certainly avail itself of the past conquests, on whose 
principles their findings will be based, but their purpose will maybe be different, 
and their concerns about the role and the survival of the Court higher.141 
It would be therefore a rash attempt to draw from our consideration some 
prescriptive instructions: the interpretive struggle we have described was deeply 
influenced by the times it was set into, and in the future different conditions will 
most probably lead to different behaviours. The instability we have recalled above 
(better: the shifting positioning adopted by the Court of Justice) might have more 
evident effects. 
That does not mean that such different attitudes will not be suitable of 
being interpreted in a similar manner: the struggle for (interpretive) power is 
going to be the constant factor determining the behaviour of the Court of Justice, 
possibly more than the European integration process.142 
                                                                                                                                     
Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights?’, (2002) 23 Human Rights Law 
Journal, 30, quoted in E. U. Petersmann, Do Judges cit., 10. 
140 Court of Justice judges risk, before our eyes, to resemble those Legal Realism scholars 
described by R.M. Unger, that are ‘like a priesthood that had lost their faith and kept their jobs. 
They [stay] in tedious embarrassment before cold altars’, see ‘The critical Legal Studies 
Movement’, (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review, 561, 675. This quote is borrowed from R. Stith, cit., 
15. 
141 We can quote in this respect what R. Stith, cit., 17) says about interpretive monopolists, such as 
the Court of Justice: ‘trust in a supreme or constitutional court to apply the law correctly is more 
and more misplaced. As belief in legal science fades, the only secular analogue to papal 
infallibility disappears. To grant any court binding power to interpret the law is thus to secure only 
order, not some preexisting law.’ 
142 Let us just note how the interpretive monopoly doctrine of the Court of Justice (ie the situation 
in which every EC actor is bound by the interpretation given by the Court of Justice, except for the 
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 We will have the opportunity to verify the legitimacy of some neo-realistic 
worries, in other words we will check whether the independency of the Court 
before national governments is doomed to decrease, now that the integration 
momentum seems to be over.143 We recall here for the sake of completeness how 
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Istance, far from playing the tyrant role 
has indeed shown some signs of deference, namely towards the European 
Convention of Human Rights and UN Security Council acts, respectively in the 
Schmidberger and in the Yusuf and Kadi cases.144 In particular, it is interesting to 
see how our model (which compares the Court of Justice – national courts 
relationship with the international tribunals – Court of Justice one) is not 
something ignored by the EC institutions: in the Kadi decision145 the parallel 
between the UN – EC and the EC – Member States systems is clearly drawn, by 
reference to the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case law. 
Now that we have become familiar with the concept of comity, and we 
have seen how its discretionary nature often hides self-interest considerations,146 
we can easily imagine a future scenario in which the Court of Justice itself will 
apply self-restraint (by means of comity, or deferential praxes) in order to better 
safeguard its existence and the persistence of its powers, vis-à-vis the rise of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies’ authoritativeness, the universalising pretensions 
of the UN Security Council and of the EctHR,147 and the lobbying pressure by 
Member States’ governments.148  
                                                                                                                                     
Court of Justice itself) is similar to the ‘judicial supremacy doctrine’ of the US Supreme Court, 
established since the 1958 Cooper v Aaron case, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401. 
143 See K. Alter, Who are the Masters cit., 121, and studies referred therein. See also O. Pollicino, 
Legal Reasoning cit., 284. Again, the similarity of the Court of Justice’s attitude with the ‘judicial 
supremacy’ US Supreme Court doctrine could lead us to compare the current US situation 
(characterized by continuous attacks to the US SC independence and supremacy, see A.M. 
Martens, ‘Reconsidering Judicial Supremacy: From the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty to 
Constitutional Transformations’, (2007) 5 Perspectives on Politics, 447) with the actual and future 
state of the EC system. 
144 See the decisions of the Court of First Instance Yusuf Al Barakaat International Foundation and 
Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission (306 and 315/01), para. 156 and para. 240 
(Kadi).  
145 See para. 224. For a comment, see C. Tomuschat, (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review, 537, 
544. In particular, the Court of First Instance states that the possible infringement of a EC 
fundamental right can not affect the validity of a Security Council resolution, and suggests that an 
analogue relationship is to be found in EC law, where an EC act can not suffer from the possible 
violation of a nationally protected right. 
146 See J. Allard and A. Garapon, La mondialisation cit.: the Authors recognize that often judicial 
cooperation must be set into an egoistic framework, given that it could well be that the reasons 
triggering comity are the same that, in other occasions, determine the rise of competition between 
courts. 
147 See A. Rosas, The European Court of Justice cit., 10. The Author underlines how the consistent 
praxis followed by the ECJ is that of backing up the interpretation given by the Court of Human 
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 Such a circumspect tactic will probably pay in terms of peacefulness, like 
the tactic adopted in the 70’s by Constitutional Courts (see supra) but, likewise, it 
will probably mean the beginning of a new era, where the Court of Justice will 
enter a declining path, whose consequences could be delayed only having 
recourse to compromises, variably disguised as courteous and gracious 
concessions.149 
We end here by noting how the same decision we have mentioned to give 
en example of national courts’ deference towards the Court of Justice (the Italian 
Berlusconi case) is taken by some Authors as an example that shows how ‘the 
[European] Court seemed ready to limit the principle of primacy’150: the two 
contemporaneous facets of the ‘hidden dialogue’ were employed on the same 
issue by the two judicial interlocutors, and a sense of comity pervaded their 
parallel action. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Rights, and supports this argument by referring to the case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-
9011 (para. 29), where the Court disregarded a precedent of its own (see cases C-46 e 227/88 
Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859), justifying its decision with the adoption of the interpretation given by 
the Court of Human Rights in the meanwhile. 
148 To a certain extent, the Court of Justice will probably have to gradually retire from fields where 
other international tribunals seem to offer a better ‘service’. In other words, the monopoly on 
interpretive action can be kept by shrinking the range of issues tackled. See J. K. Cogan, 
‘Competition and Control in International Adjudication’, (2008) 48 Virginia Journal of 
International Law (forthcoming). See draft available at www.law.uga.edu/intl/Cogan.pdf, 25. For 
a list of recent or pending cases, which shows the increase of the judicial competition, see A. 
Rosas, The European Court of Justice cit., 15.  
149 Similar borderline situations (hovering between spontaneous recognition of outer values and 
legal obligation flowing from superior legal order) occurred in the WTO framework as well. 
Suffice it here to recall the Kimberley Diamonds waiver, by which the WTO waived free trade 
obligations that could favour the trade of “war diamonds”. The act adopted (implementing the 
content of a UN Security Council) could be interpreted either as a mere clarification of how jus 
cogens can operate within the WTO legal system or as a gracious opening of this latter to 
otherwise irrelevant issues. See J. Pauwelyn, ‘WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What 
to Make of the WTO Waiver for "Conflict Diamonds"’, (2003) 24 Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 1177. 
150 See A. Biondi and R. Mastroianni, ‘Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02, 
Berlusconi and others’, (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review, 553, 569. 
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